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Visualising the unknown knowns in archaeology:  
why prehistory must not always look the same
Raimund Karl 
Prifysgol Bangor University
„… because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things that we know that we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, February 2002
Abstract 
The act of reconstructing something from very fragmentary traces requires us to depict unknown knowns, things 
that we know existed, but of which we have no actual knowledge. We know that a posthole did once contain 
a post, but whether that post – at least above ground – was round or square, plain or highly decorated, or how 
high it was, is something we do not know. At best, we can make rough estimates, but usually those have a wide 
margin of error. In visualising that uncertainty, applying Occam’s razor – usually a sound scientific principle – is 
the worst possible choice: if always using the minimal assumptions necessary to reconstruct houses from posts, the 
outcome will necessarily be the same minimalistic result. And since a picture says more than a thousand words, 
we will impress a fundamentally false picture of the past on everyone’s mind: on that of the public; but also on 
our own, who are equally influenced by the illustrations we see in each other’s work.
Thus, in this paper, I will argue that for making our reconstructions more reliable depictions of the past – not 
in terms of the details we show on each individual one, but in terms of the overall picture of the past we convey 
through reconstructions in general – we need to be radically creative. We need to produce, not just the reconstruc-
tion of how the object of our attempt most likely looked, but several reconstructions which show the range (the 
‘standard deviation’) of conceivable possibilities of how it might have looked like – even if, for this purpose, we 
have to make maximal assumptions.
R. Karl, J. Leskovar [Hrsg.] (205), Interpretierte Eisenzeiten. Fallstudien, Methoden, Theorie. Tagungsbeiträge der 6. Linzer Gespräche
zur interpretativen Eisenzeitarchäologie. Studien zur Kulturgeschichte von Oberösterreich, Folge  , Linz, 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Rekonstruktion fragmentarisch erhaltener Dinge macht es erforderlich, bekannte Unbekannte darzustellen; 
Dinge von deren Existenz wir zwar wissen, aber von denen wir dennoch keine genaue Kenntnis haben. Wir 
wissen zwar, dass ein Pfostenloch dereinst einen Pfosten enthalten hat, aber ob dieser Pfosten – wenigstens über 
der Erdoberfläche – rund oder rechteckig, unverziert oder verziert oder wie hoch er genau war, ist etwas, wovon 
wir nichts wissen. Im besten Fall können wir mit groben Schätzwerten operieren, aber diese lassen einen breiten 
Raum für Abweichungen. Bei der Darstellung dieser Unsicherheit ist die Anwendung von Occam’s Rasiermesser 
– gewöhnlich ein solides Prinzip der Wissenschaft – die schlechteste mögliche Lösung: legt man allen Rekon-
struktionen, die z. B. aus Pfostenlöchern Häuser machen sollen, stets die wenigsten Annahmen zu Grunde, wird 
das Ergebnis stets gleichermaßen minimalistische Rekonstruktionen sein. Und nachdem ein Bild mehr sagt als 
1000 Worte erwecken wir bei allen Betrachtern einen falschen Eindruck über die Vergangenheit: sowohl bei der 
Öffentlichkeit als auch bei uns selbst, die wir alle gleichermaßen durch Bilder, die wir in der Arbeit anderer sehen, 
beeinflusst werden.
Daher argumentiere ich in diesem Beitrag dass wir, um unsere Rekonstruktionen insgesamt verlässlicher zu 
machen – nicht unbedingt in Bezug auf die gezeigten Details in jedem konkreten Einzelfall, sondern im Ge-
samtbild, das wir durch unsere gesammelten Rekonstruktionsversuche erzeugen – radikal kreativ sein müssen. 
Statt stets nur die eine, uns selbst am wahrscheinlichsten erscheinende, minimalistische Rekonstruktion eines 
konkreten Befundes zu zeigen, sollten wir jeweils mehrere Rekonstruktionsversuche anstellen, die das Spektrum 
(die „Standardabweichung“) der vorstellbaren Rekonstruktionsmöglichkeiten zeigen – selbst wenn wir dafür 
Maximalannahmen treffen müssen.
The very point of studying archaeology is to explain, by 
means of examining the fragmentary remains that survive 
and other evidence, those aspects of the past which have 
not survived; at least if we want to understand archaeo­
logy as a scholarly endeavour and not just plain collecting. 
Whether in words (for thoughts on verbal reconstruc­
tion see Leskovar 2005) or images (see for a first stab at 
this Karl 999), visualising archaeology by reconstructive 
interpretation aims at creating a ‘complete’ image from 
fragmentary records to increase scholarly and public un­
derstanding of the past. This ‘filling of the gaps’ is, ulti­
mately, a process of creatively imagining the ‘whole’, of 
‘making it up’ by putting into the image things we know 
were there without knowing exactly how they original­
ly looked like. Ideally, what we fill into these gaps should 
be based on solid research, careful consideration of what 
could have been there, and how it probably looked like. 
But in practice, as often as not, we are required to make 
up these gap­fillers as we go along. 
This requirement to – quite frequently – make it up as 
In a rather famous and much derided, but nonetheless 
quite perceptive statement, Donald Rumsfeld, then US 
Secretary of Defence, talked about three categories of 
known and unknown things: things that we know that 
we know, his known knowns, things we know we do not 
know, the known unknowns, and things we don’t even 
know we don’t know, the unknown unknowns. In ar­
chaeological reconstructions, we often deal with a fourth 
category of things that Rumsfeld missed in his statement, 
the unknown knowns: things we know that they existed, 
but which, of themselves, are mostly unknown to us. For 
instance, we know that a posthole will at some time have 
contained a post, but of that post itself we usually have 
very little knowledge: it is unknown to us how much it 
rose above ground, whether it was (at least above ground) 
round or square, or whether it was plain or highly deco­
rated. Yet in reconstructions, it is exactly these unknown 
knowns about which we need to make visual statements: 
they, after all, are what makes up the gaps that need to be 
filled to be able to create a meaningful picture.

we go along is due to the fact that the main problem we 
face in reconstructing the past is that – in difference to 
the pars pro toto burial good placed in somebody’s tomb 
by some prehistoric burial community which most prob­
ably referred to a ‘whole’ well­known to that community 
– the ‘whole’ that we are trying to show is unknown to us. 
Thus, visualising it is riddled with uncertainties like the 
ones described above for the post in the posthole: we do 
not know whether the post to fit the hole in our image is 
round or square, and many a times, there is no way of de­
ciding either way, because there is no evidence at all that 
makes the one choice more likely than the other. 
In a verbal description, we can say as much: the post, 
above ground, may have been round or square, and we 
have no means to decide which way it actually was. In an 
image, however, showing this uncertainty is much more 
problematic: if we draw an image of the post, we have to 
make a decision to show it either as a round or as a square 
post, since both is not possible in the same image. 
But images not only can, but usually do say more than 
a thousand words: think of the reconstruction of a house 
from a more or less arbitrarily chosen selection of post­
holes on an archaeological site. Such an image normally 
does not only show the posts and whether they are square 
or round, but also the walls between them, the roof above 
them, and a myriad of other aspects that cannot be de­
duced from the postholes and any finds made in or be­
tween them alone. Thus, each visual (or indeed physical) 
reconstruction on its own is quite powerful already: the 
unsuspecting beholder, whether layman or expert, with 
but a simple glance, gets a whole lot of information about 
a house that would take him quite some time to read up 
upon. And since it is visual, he is much more likely to re­
member it, and much more likely to internalise it than a 
longwinded description that does not actually come down 
on either side of the ‘round or square peg’ question. The 
visual statement is unequivocal, does not allow for ambi­
guities and is not suited to show uncertainty, and thus gives 
a straight answer to an equally straight question: What do 
these random­looking splotches on a site plan mean? Well, 
they are what is left of a house, and the house looked like 
that shown on the reconstruction image. 
A visual reconstruction thus provides a definitive an­
swer to the question of ‘how the past actually was’, and 
definitive answers are what most of its beholders – includ­
ing most professional archaeologists – are actually look­
ing for, at least subconsciously. While we as professionals 
may consciously be fully aware that whatever statement 
any one of us makes about the past is just the statement’s 
author’s (probably best) guess of ‘how the past could have 
been’, the more certain the statement appears to be, the 
more likely it is that we are going to take it at face value. 
Thus, visual reconstructions are particularly effective in 
shaping our perception of the past.
Accuracy vs. reliability of statements
Any statement – whether verbal or visual – about partic­
ular values of anything ideally has two essential properties: 
it ideally is both accurate and reliable. This is particularly 
true if the statement is not just any ordinary statement, 
but a scholarly statement: after all, scholarship aims to find 
‘the truth’ about what it studies, or at least an approxi­
mation as close to ‘the truth’ as we can get1. In a recon­
struction image, the properties of a post – whether it is 
square or round, plain or decorated, etc., are such values 
and thus ideally should also have the properties of being 
both accurate and reliable.
Yet, where statements about uncertain values are con­
cerned, the properties of accuracy and reliability do not 
necessarily match each other, but more often tend to be 
mutually exclusive. Let us first take a short look at what 
each of these two properties describe:
The accuracy of a statement (e.g. a measurement) about 
something (e.g. a quantity) is the degree of closeness to its 
actual (= true) nature (e.g. its value). The closer the state­
ment about the value of it is to its actual value, the more 
accurate the statement is. 
To provide a short example, an accurate statement about 
the number of apples in the bowl in figure  would be 
 This is even the case in epistemologies that allow for the possibility that there is no ‘truth’ as such, but only ‘useful knowledge’, as is the 
case in most constructivist epistemologies: ‘useful’ knowledge is, then, usually defined as such that does provide solutions to problems 
that actually work in reality. Naturally, to be considered as actually useful, the knowledge produced must not just work in individual 
instances, but in all or at least most instances where the same problem is encountered, and for doing that, the knowledge must both 
be accurate and reliable.
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‘This bowl contains 6 apples’. Of course, only 5 apples 
are actually visible in the image, but we can reasonably 
assume from the arrangement of the visible apples in the 
bowl that there actually is a sixth apple in it, which is just, 
due to the perspective of the shot, hidden behind the oth­
er apples. Thus, the accurate statement about the actual 
number of apples in the bowl is not that it contains 5, but 
that it contains 6 apples, because 6 apples is the most likely 
actual value of the number of apples in that bowl.
Yet, we cannot be absolutely sure about this, but rather, 
the actual number of apples in the bowl is uncertain. This 
is where the reliability of a statement comes in.
In difference to the accuracy of a statement, a statement 
about something (e.g. a quantity) is reliable if it (most like­
ly) includes the actual (true) nature of that something (e.g. 
its value). Where a statement about something uncertain 
is concerned, a reliable statement thus is usually at least 
somewhat inaccurate, since it needs to capture the whole 
range of possible values, rather than just being as close as 
possible to the actual value.
Where our example in figure  is concerned, the reli­
able statement about the quantity of apples in the bowl 
would be ‘This bowl contains between 5 and 7 (or 6 +/­ ) 
apples’. This is for the reason that the image shows that 
there are at least 5 apples in the bowl, because that is the 
number of apples we can count on the image. However, 
due to the perspective of the shot, there is a distinct pos­
sibility that at least one, possibly even two apples may be 
hidden behind the visible apples (although if it were 2, 
they would probably have to be somewhat smaller than 
the quite evenly­sized apples visible on the image – but 
the possibility for this being the case cannot be exclud­
ed with certainty). Thus, to make a statement that in­
cludes the actual value of apples in that bowl, we need 
to express the minimum and maximum amount possible 
by giving a confidence interval: we are uncertain about 
the precise number, but are (reasonably) certain (= con­
fident) that the actual number of apples in the bowl is 
between the minimum and maximum values expressed 
in the statement.
In terms of our problem, accurate statements create an 
impression of certainty: they aim to be as precise as pos­
sible, and precision requires certainty about the actual 
value(s) of properties of the object of the statement. Re­
liable statements, on the other hand, clearly show the de­
gree of uncertainty about the actual value(s) of properties 
of the object of the statement. The requirement of visual 
reconstructions to be decisive about every value of every 
(unknown known) property of the object of the recon­
struction thus naturally lends itself to the creation of vis­
ual statements that will be perceived as accurate; though 
– given that we have to be decisive regarding the value 
of each individual property of the object that is to be de­
picted – they are unlikely to be reliable. And that, in my 
opinion, is a problem, particularly if reconstructive visu­
alisations are not seen individually on a case by case basis, 
but on the whole as in sum creating a particularly deci­
sive picture of the past.
Occam‘s Razor reconstructions
William of Ockham (c. 287–7 AD) was an English 
Franciscan Friar and one of the foremost medieval think­
ers. His principle of parsimony in explanation and theory 
building, which has become known as Occam’s Razor, 
effectively argues that when constructing any kind of ex­
planation or theory (that is, any scholarly statement), one 
should make no more assumptions than absolutely neces­
sary. This since has also been interpreted that if one is to 
make a scholarly selection between different, competing 
scholarly statements, the one which requires the fewest 
assumptions should be selected.
This principle – which is considered to, at least usual­
ly, be a sound and useful scholarly principle – normally 
tends to guide our thinking when creating visual recon­
structions of archaeological objects: we like to use the 
least amount of absolutely necessary assumptions to ar­
rive at what we then frequently perceive to be a ‘reasona­
Fig. 1: A bowl of apples.
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bly’ accurate approximation of what our object of interest 
would have (actually) looked like. At any rate, we tend to 
be very concerned about getting those bits right for which 
we have evidence, that is, the known knowns of Donald 
Rumsfeld. After all, we know these things were there, 
and they looked exactly the way they are being shown, 
so that bit of the image created is certainly accurate. For 
everything else, however, we tend to go with the min­
imal assumptions: if there is a posthole, there must have 
been a post, but that post is shown (most often) as a sim­
ple, round and plain tree trunk without any hint at having 
been transformed by human action. After all, showing it 
as a round ‘quasi­natural’ post requires only the assump­
tion that a tree has been felled and cut to the right length, 
while showing it as a square post adds to this the assump­
tion that it was not only felled and cut, but also worked 
into square shape. Thus, Occam’s Razor is applied and we 
stick with the simple round shape, at least as long as we 
do not have any evidence (e.g. the actual posthole in the 
post­pit or surviving remains of the post itself are clear­
ly square in shape) to the contrary. Similarly, if we have a 
rectangular alignment of postholes, we connect the gaps 
between the posts with some walling, with a door in one 
of those walls, and put as simple a roof on it as is pos­
sible, because, again, all these are the minimal assump­
tions necessary to show the post alignment ‘accurately’ as 
what it most likely was, a rectangular building. What we 
do not put into our reconstruction, however, are win­
dows, an upper floor, internal dividing walls creating sev­
eral separated rooms, or anything else that would require 
us to make additional assumptions about how the build­
ing might have looked like.
This process creates – usually – just one single image of 
the reconstructed, the one we are feeling ‘confident’ with, 
since we stuck as closely as possible to the attested evi­
dence and added nothing that was not absolutely neces­
sary: we didn’t make anything up that we had no evidence 
for, but only showed what we were certain about. To give 
an example, in the case of a more or less random arrange­
ment of posts (fig. 2), we find those posts that seem to rea­
sonably align into rectangular arrangements and connect 
all posts in each rectangle to provide a framework for two 
simple buildings adjacent to each other (fig. ). We then 
draw each of them using the minimal assumptions nec­
essary and thus turn them into the definitive reconstruc­
tion of the two buildings that probably would have stood 
on the site in the Iron Age (fig. ). 
And with that, we consider our job done, and done 
well, since we haven’t made up anything that we didn’t 
absolutely have to make up to make buildings out of the 
surviving postholes. We have shown nothing but what 
we know for certain – that there were posts there – and 
what is necessary to provide the beholder with an image 
that is actually meaningful, that shows our interpretation 
Fig. 2: A more or less random arrangement of postholes (sketch 
based on a real find at Göttlesbrunn. Lower Austria;  
Karl, Prochaska 2005, 25).
Fig. 3: The posts from fig. 2 sketched up to provide a basic 
framework for two rectangular buildings adjacent to each other.
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of rectangular post alignments as buildings. But what we 
have not shown at all is any uncertainty, anything we ad­
mit we do not know even though we know it must have 
been there in some way, shape or form. We have created 
an impression of accuracy where in fact, what we should 
have aimed for is a reliable visualisation: after all, the build­
ing or buildings on the site may well not have looked an­
ything like what is shown on this reconstruction drawing 
(fig. ) at all, but may have looked quite different. But that 
possibility that it may very well have looked very differ­
ent is something we neglected to show: we provided a de­
finitive image only, and that is how the average beholder 
will from now on imagine the buildings on site will have 
looked like, for certain.
Wrong impressions of accuracy
Visual reconstructions create impressions, that much is 
beyond doubt. And if we follow the above process of us­
ing Occam’s Razor, using the minimum assumptions nec­
essary to arrive at an explanatory (visual) statement and 
produce just one picture per object to be reconstructed, 
we in each individual case create an impression of accu­
racy and thus of certainty (and the more of the actual ev­
idence that has survived we include in the image, ideally 
with the originals being displayed side by side with the 
reconstruction, the greater the impression of certainty is 
that we create: after all, if we take such great care to get 
every individual detail showing evidence that has survived 
absolutely right in our reconstruction, who in their right 
mind would assume that other parts of the reconstruc­
tion that are shown in the same way are any less accurate 
and certain?). After all, the average beholder, but even the 
scholarly beholder, will assume that if that and not another 
reconstruction was created, there must be a good reason 
for this and not another reconstruction being shown: after 
all, the reconstruction is a part of scholarly work and thus 
supposed to be based on sound reasoning. So if it is this 
image, rather than another, that is being shown, and shown 
as the definitive image of the object reconstructed, the re­
construction must be reasonably accurate and the scholar 
who created it reasonably certain about it. Why else show 
it, after all? This already creates a problem in each indi­
vidual case: the actual uncertainty about many elements 
of the reconstruction disappears entirely for the behold­
er, and a wrong sense of accuracy and certainty replaces 
any potential awareness of the uncertainty contained in 
the image that the beholder might consciously have had 
even where this individual case is concerned. 
But matters are even worse if one considers the bigger 
picture of how all individual reconstructions will influ­
ence the beholders perception of the past if not seen in­
dependently of each other, but in conjunction. And most 
beholders will not just see a single reconstruction and con­
sider that single image in isolation from all other such im­
ages that also exist, but – at least over the course of many 
years or even over the course of an entire academic ca­
reer – will see many such reconstructions. Of course, each 
reconstruction they see will be different in some regards 
from most others, because many will be based on different 
original features and thus will look somewhat differently. 
However, if all, or even only a sizeable number of these 
images was ultimately created using the same minimalistic 
principle that underlies Occam’s Razor, they will all look 
roughly the same, that is, will appear similarly minimalis­
tic. And since each and every single one of them will be 
perceived by the beholder as an ‘independently arrived at’, 
probably ‘accurate’ result of a scholarly process of making 
reasoned decision, the repetitive similarity provides posi­
tive feedback regarding the certainty of each independent 
reconstruction as well as the overall picture that the be­
holder creates in his mind of the object of reconstruction: 
Fig. 4: A reconstruction sketch of the two buildings from fig. 2 
using the minimal assumptions necessary to show them as a 
larger and smaller building adjacent to each other.
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in scholarly terms, each similarly looking reconstruction 
will be perceived as an independent confirmation of the 
certainty of each individual reconstruction. The overall re­
sult, thus, is a massively increased perception of the level 
of accuracy or certainty that the past, on average, looked 
like all these reconstructions that confirm each other; and 
thus of an increased perception of that the past will actu­
ally accurately have been absolutely minimalistic. In our 
case of the Iron Age houses, all Iron Age houses will in­
creasingly be perceived as primitive, minimalistic shelters 
that all looked pretty much the same.
If seen in conjunction, similarly minimalistic recon­
structions, which are similarly minimalistic because the 
same minimalistic problem­solving principle has been ap­
plied in the decision­making process that led to their cre­
ation, works like Pavlovian conditioning: much like the 
dog whose saliva starts to run if he hears a bell which in 
the past regularly announced that he would get some 
food, our perception of how the past looked like is con­
ditioned towards a very specific result, a result which in 
turn will inform how we depict the same object in fu­
ture reconstruction drawings. The result is a self­fulfill­
ing prophecy, that of a uniform picture of the past. Yet, if 
there is one thing we can be and are reasonably certain 
about, it is that ‘the past’ was anything but uniform: all 
our evidence, for instance in the Iron Age archaeological 
record, seems to confirm that regional, social, economic 
and other differences appear frequently in the record and 
frequently even seem to have been clearly and conscious­
ly expressed. There was not one uniform European Iron 
Age, but many different European Iron Ages. 
Thus, creating reconstruction images that – due to the 
very method by which they were created, and exclusive­
ly for the reason of that method being applied – create an 
impression that the Iron Age was uniform after all, clearly 
creates a fundamentally flawed and horribly wrong pic­
ture. It is exactly the opposite of what we are trying to 
show to the beholders of our work, and it is almost com­
ical that the means we use for the purpose of making our 
results more palatable to our beholders creates the very 
opposite message than we are trying to get across. By cre­
ating reconstructions the way we always have done and 
still mostly do, we are creating a certainty and a wrong 
sense of accuracy that more effectively counteracts the 
point we are trying to get across than anything any of us 
could ever say about the Iron Age.
Thus, I would argue that, for getting our message heard 
(or seen) and understood, we must move away from meth­
ods of reconstruction (whether verbal or visual) that cre­
ate false impressions of the accuracy and certainty of our 
results where there is none. Instead of trying to create ac­
curate reconstructions, what we must aim for is to create 
reliable reconstructions; reconstructions that clearly show 
uncertainty where it exists. 
For achieving this aim of producing reliable rather than 
accurate reconstructions, I would argue that we need to 
proceed very differently than we have in the past: rather 
than showing one (minimalistic) definitive image of what­
ever we try to reconstruct and aiming for a maximum of 
certainty while avoiding like the devil any assumptions 
that are not entirely necessary; I would suggest we pro­
ceed like scientists by providing not just a single recon­
struction of the object we are trying to reconstruct, but 
rather produce several different reconstructions, one using 
minimal, some using a few, and others using maximum 
assumptions, to show the confidence interval for each set 
of reconstructions, the degree of uncertainty contained 
in the reconstructive process.
The confidence interval
So what is the confidence we have to reckon with in pre­
modern wooden architecture, to stick with the example of 
house reconstructions? There is, in fact, plenty that is pos­
sible to build in wood with pre­modern tools and tech­
nology, and there is no reason to believe that Iron Age 
carpenters were unable to match, at least in some cases, 
the crafting skills required for building some of the finer 
examples of wooden architecture that still survives in ei­
ther models or indeed, in case of medieval buildings, in 
original until today. To provide a few images one can easily 
grab from the Internet, there are, for instance, clay models 
from Han Dynasty watchtowers, now held in Metropoli­
tan Museum of Art in New York (fig. 5) that clearly show 
that the ancient Chinese were able to build quite elabo­
rate, multi­storeyed, elaborately decorated wooden struc­
tures in the st and 2nd centuries AD. Similarly, Heddal 
Stave Church (fig. 6), the largest such church in Norway, 
which dates from the early th century AD, is anything 
but a simple, plain and minimalistic construction. Simi­
larly elaborate wooden buildings from the medieval and 
early modern period survive in many a European coun­
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try until today, and while there are indeed some that are 
rather plain, simple and quite minimalistic, many are not, 
but are rather complex, elaborate and partially intricate­
ly decorated. 
That there is no reason to assume that Iron Age wood­
en architecture would have been – at least in some cases 
– any less developed or elaborate than any of these build­
ings is demonstrated by the well­known picture­postcards 
of late prehistoric landscapes (including houses) in form 
of rock carvings from the Val Camonica in Italy (fig. 7, 
Audouze, Büchsenschütz 99, 8). These clearly seem to 
show multi­storey buildings with upper storeys protrud­
ing beyond the lower ones, or possibly balconies, and ex­
ternal stairs or ladders leading up to some of them, which 
seem more reminiscent of medieval and early modern al­
pine wooden farm architecture than anything we usual­
ly show in our reconstructions of Iron Age buildings. We 
even have clear evidence of the existence of wooden stairs 
in enclosed spaces considerably pre­dating the Iron Age in 
the form of the wooden stair recovered in the Hallstatt salt 
mine excavations and dated to / BC (Reschreiter, 
Kowarik 2008, 6­), for decorated wooden grave­boards 
from a burial on the Dürrnberg bei Hallein (see H. Wend­
ling, this volume), and of course for internal divisions of 
buildings from at least some of the houses uncovered dur­
ing the excavations in the Ramsautal on the Dürrnberg 
bei Hallein, too (Lobisser 2005, 2­7), as well as strati­
graphic evidence from at least one building in Roseldorf 
an der Schmida in Lower Austria for that building having 
been multi­storeyed (pers.comm. K. Löcker) – and this is 
using examples from just Austria alone. 
Thus, there is not the slightest reason to assume that the 
confidence interval for reconstructing Iron Age houses in 
Europe is narrow, quite to the contrary: the confidence 
interval we have to assume for Iron Age wooden architec­
ture is very wide, and includes pretty much every imagi­
nable and technically possible possibility for elaboration. 
It is, at any rate, definitely much wider than what the re­
petitive visualisation of Iron Age buildings in reconstruc­
tions as plain, simple and minimalistic open­plan structures 
with no forms of elaboration whatsoever would have us 
believe. We have to accept that there is a distinct possi­
bility that the confidence interval for Iron Age buildings 
includes the possibility for them having been multi­sto­
reyed, possibly even with protruding upper storeys and / 
or balconies, having had internal divisions to create sep­
arate smaller rooms, proper stairs, perhaps even grandiose 
staircases, front, back and side doors, windows, dormer 
windows, wooden chimneys, and so on, and also the pos­
Fig. 5: Models of Han Dynasty (25­220 AD) wooden watch­
towers from China (image: PericlesofAthens 2008, http://com­
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Earthenware_architecture_mod­
els,_Eastern_Han_Dynasty,_.JPG).




sibility that they would have been lavishly decorated with 
painted or carved artwork. 
It is this range, the range from the very simplistic and 
minimalistic open plan house with just a single floor, no 
or hardly any windows and the most basic roof construc­
tion put on top of them, to the very complex, multi­
storeyed, extremely elaborate building whose decoration 
programme alone was immensely labour­intensive to cre­
ate, that we must show in reconstructions of Iron Age 
houses to create a reliable rather than an apparently ‘accu­
rate’, but in fact incredibly misleading picture of Iron Age 
realities. Unless we present that whole confidence interval, 
we’re in effect misleading our audience into believing that 
we know for certain what ‘the European Iron Age house’ 
looked like, while in fact we don’t, because there was no 
such thing as ‘the European Iron Age house’, but many 
different houses of very different degrees of elaboration.
Reliable reconstructions
So what, then, about ‘my’ house(s) as shown in fig. ? This, 
then, clearly cannot be ‘the Göttlesbrunn house’, but only 
the minimalistic reconstruction which defines the lower 
end of the confidence interval of how that particular set 
of postholes might be reconstructed. To create a reliable 
reconstruction, illustrating the confidence interval is nec­
essary, and to achieve this, I have created several sketches 
of possible reconstructions of the same set of features and 
combined them into one illustration (fig. 8). 
By including (in this case) a sketch of the original fea­
tures in the same perspective that was also used to create 
the various alternative reconstructions also shown (though 
it would, of course, be possible to include an original plan 
of the actual features using the same perspective as used 
for the reconstruction drawings instead of a sketch), the 
evidence upon which the reconstructions are based is in­
cluded in the image – so the known known, that of which 
we are certain, is included for the viewer’s benefit. In the 
centre at the top, the reconstruction I personally think is 
preferable for various reasons (excluded for this discussion, 
since they are not particularly relevant for the purpose of 
this paper) is given prominence: this not only clarifies for 
viewers what I, hopefully based on sound scholarly rea­
soning, consider as the most likely way the Göttlesbrunn 
house(s) may have looked like (or, in other words, what 
I think to be the most ‘accurate’ reconstruction) but also 
– should they be looking for such – provides them with 
an authoritative opinion to the question of ‘how did that 
house in Göttlesbrunn most likely look like; providing a 
simple answer to a simple question, if you will. Howev­
er, rather than stopping there (as we usually tend to do), 
I also included, to the bottom left and right, but at (ap­
proximately) the same scale as the central image and thus 
only slightly less prominent than the central image, what 
I consider to be reconstructions of the same building(s) 
at the far lower and upper end of the confidence inter­
val: the ‘minimalist’ reconstruction (which is the same as 
on fig. ) using Occam’s Razor as the guiding principle 
and thus the least – only the necessary – assumptions for 
making houses out of postholes at the bottom left; and the 
‘maximalist’ reconstruction, using as many assumptions for 
elaborating the building that I feel reasonably confident 
could reflect what the Göttlesbrunn house might possibly 
have looked like at the bottom right. In addition (just to 
show that we need not stop at  images either), I also in­
clude at the bottom center of the image and at a smaller 
scale, a few more possible reconstructions which fall with­
in the range defined by the confidence interval.
With this, the reconstruction indicates to viewers not 
just the range of possibilities of how the Göttlesbrunn 
house might have actually looked like, but also clearly 
visualises the uncertainty inherent to the reconstructive 
process; if you will, I show that there are many unknown 
knowns in the image which can be reconstructed in many 
different ways. Rather than making all decisions for be­
Fig. 7: Bronze and Iron Age rock carvings from Val Camonica, 
Italy, showing multi­storeyed houses with protruding upper  
storeys and external stairs/ladders (Audouze, Büchsenschütz  
99, 8).
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holders, the (at least reasonably) reliable set of reconstruc­
tions invites and requires them not just to think about the 
process that leads from the attested fragments to the re­
constructive visualisation of the ‘whole’ object, but also to 
consider, for themselves, which version they would chose 
as their preferred one, and for which reasons.
Of course, one needs to note that, even if we show sever­
al options of how each object we try to reconstruct might 
have looked like, and provide a confidence interval for 
each, it is still us that define the range of possible percep­
tions by defining – as the scholars who speak with some 
degree of authority – the spectrum covered by the con­
fidence interval we decide to show. After all, in the case 
of the Göttlesbrunn house(s), even more fanciful recon­
structions drawings than even my most elaborate option 
shows might well have been technically possible: for in­
stance, I limited myself to no more than 2 full storeys and 
a used loft space with dormer windows, while – at least 
technically – a third, fourth or even more storeys would 
probably be possible, too. Equally, I restricted myself to 
the basic form of a ‘standard’ rectangular house, rather 
than putting a fanciful tower and various levels of roof­
ing on it, like we can see it on Heddal Stave Church (fig. 
6). I also restricted myself quite strongly where decora­
tion is concerned, since I could have tried to show (even 
within the limits of a small sketch) much more carved and 
colourfully painted elements, both possibilities we can­
not, with absolute certainty, exclude. And of course I to­
Fig. 8: A reliable reconstruction of ‘the Göttlesbrunn house(s)’, illustrating not just the uncertainty  
inherent in the reconstructive process, but also the range of possible choices.
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tally neglected the possibility that the various postholes 
that are the evidentiary basis for the reconstruction could 
be connected with each other in several other ways, too, 
like creating 2 6­post and one 0 post building standing 
in parallel to each other. 
In the specific case, the main reason why I opted against 
all those possibilities is that it would not just have over­
complicated the point I am trying to make in this paper, 
but also because I do think, for various reasons, that the 
recorded features used as the ‘inspiration’ for these draw­
ings were in fact either just one house, or at the most a 
house and a ­post building standing next to it, and also 
were in fact a relatively modest farmhouse in an equally 
modest farmstead, and not something much more fan­
ciful. Thus, the ‘maximalist’ reconstruction I show at the 
bottom right of figure 8, in my opinion, is already push­
ing it; is at least close to, if not already well beyond, the 
limit of my personal confidence in what could actually 
have stood at Göttlesbrunn. 
In trying to provide a reliable reconstruction, restrict­
ing the confidence interval is as important as providing 
one in the first place: after all, when trying to provide a 
reliable statement, we don’t just want to show what val­
ues are theoretically possible, but rather what we believe 
are values that are, to a greater or lesser extent, proba­
ble in the specific case we are dealing with. The range of 
values we want to provide when visualising uncertainty 
is that into which we are reasonably confident the actu­
al value of what we are visualising will have fallen into. 
This restriction provides the degree of accuracy of our 
statements: while we do not know, and probably cannot 
know, whether the building(s) that stood at Göttlesbrunn 
looked more like the minimalistic or maximalistic recon­
struction shown on figure 8, I am reasonably certain that 
the way the building(s) at Göttlesbrunn looked like falls 
within the range defined by these two limits. Thus, show­
ing those two limits is not just a reliable, but also as ac­
curate a statement as I can make, the values shown are as 
close as I believe we can get to the actual values of what 
once was there.
Conclusions
When trying to reconstruct an unknown ‘whole’ from 
surviving archaeological fragments, and particularly when 
creating visual (or indeed tangible) reconstructions, we 
usually face a fundamental dilemma: while we know that 
many elements must have been there, we often know little 
if anything about their actual nature. Yet in any reconstruc­
tion, particularly in visual and tangible ones, it is particu­
larly important to fill these gaps, because that is the very 
point of attempting a reconstruction in the first place. This 
requires us to make numerous decisions in the process of 
creating the reconstruction, decisions that, particularly in 
visual and tangible reconstructions, are and have usually 
not been shown in the end product of the reconstructive 
process, the reconstruction, itself; not least because the me­
dium of a visual image or tangible object does not allow 
to show uncertainty or indeed multiformity: one recon­
struction image only allows to show one state of possible 
values, not several at once.
As of yet, when creating reconstructions, we have usual­
ly strived for maximum accuracy by producing one image 
and one image only, the image which shows what we be­
lieve to be the most likely way that whatever we depict­
ed looked like. Yet, it seems to me that this not just hides 
the fact that in producing this image, we made many de­
cisions which often could equally well have been made 
quite differently, with no particularly good reasons for why 
to choose the one possibility above the other, but partic­
ularly hides the fact that any such images contain a high 
degree of uncertainty. Thus, a false impression of certain­
ty is created for viewers, who often do not even know 
that there is a high degree of uncertainty glossed over by 
the image, but rather take it at face value.
At the same time, to avoid the risk of being accused to 
have made up ‘fantasy reconstructions’, we scholars tend 
to use Occam’s Razor as the guiding principle in creat­
ing such reconstructions: we try to stick to the actual ev­
idence as closely as possible and make as few assumptions 
as possible when creating these images. However, this has 
unintended and unwanted side effects, most important­
ly the side effect that most our reconstructions end up 
looking rather minimalistic and simplistic and thus rather 
similar to each other. This, in turn, has the equally unin­
tended consequence that we inadvertently create a rather 
uniform picture of the past we are trying to reconstruct, 
since each individual, equally minimalistic and simplistic 
reconstruction is seen by most viewers as an independ­
ent confirmation that not just each, but all reconstructed 
objects of similar type (e.g, houses) looked pretty much 
the same throughout much of prehistory. Yet, this is ac­
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tually the opposite of the message that we want to send, 
that prehistory – even within the same narrow time pe­
riod within whatever groups or divisions we have created 
based on whatever archaeological features or finds – is an­
ything but uniform, but rather as diverse, messy and com­
plicated as today’s world.
Thus I argue that when we create reconstructions, we 
ought to aim not for an elusive and unachievable accuracy, 
but rather for reliability. This is best achieved by providing 
not just one, but several reconstructions of the same object, 
which serve to define a confidence interval; that is, limits 
defining a range of possibilities we are reasonably certain 
the object we are trying to reconstruct will actually have 
fallen into. By doing so, we not only make the uncertain­
ties apparent that would be hidden if we were to provide 
just a single image, but also encourage beholders to think 
about the reconstructive process itself and make their own 
decisions about what they think is most likely.
More important than that, however, is that showing a 
multiplicity of different but possible reconstructions rather 
than just ‘the one’ that seems most likely to us, counteracts 
the false impression of the uniformity of the perceived past 
that results from Occam’s Razor reconstructions. Particu­
larly when seen in conjunction with each other, multiple 
reconstructions of each of the same type of object will in­
crease the awareness amongst viewers of the – at least po­
tential – multiformity of the past, and thus will be much 
more successful of getting the message across that we ac­
tually want audience to hear: that the European Iron Age 
and the people living in it were neither simple nor prim­
itive, nor all uniform and the same, but as diverse in al­
most every regard as we are, if not even more so.
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